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IN THE! s,UPREME COUR:T 
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Case No. 87 40 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
(Numbers in parentheses refeT to pages of the 
record. The parties vvill be referred to here as they 
appeared in the trial court.) 
HISTORY OF THE LITIGATION 
This action was brought by Rex Holland individually 
and as Administrator with the Will Annexed of the Es-
tate of his father, John G. I-!olland, deceased, against 
Arthur Moreton, a lawyer, and members of Moreton's 
immediate family and ag.ainst five corporations. Before 
the case came to trial the lower court denied a motion 
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to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment filed by 
the Moreton's (146), but granted a motion for summary 
judgment filed by the corporate defendants (63, 64). 
\Vhile that judgment was affirmed, Holland v. Colurnbia 
Iron Mining Co., 4 Utah 2d 303, 293 P. 2d 700, this Court 
specifically cautioned: 
"But nothing herein contained should in any 
respect be construed as a determination of any of 
the issues as between the appellants and the indi-
vidual defendants." 
The evidence introduced in this case was substan-
tially the same as the evidence considered by this Court 
in the appe.al of the corporate defendants on the basis of 
which evidence the following statement of facts was made 
in the opinion of Justice Crockett ( 4 Utah 2d at 308): 
"It appears that after conversations with 
Mathesius, l\foreton contacted the Hollands at 
Cedar City with respect to the patenting of the 
1nining claiins in question 'vhich plaintiffs had 
previously located ,,~ith a vie"~ to eventually ar-
ranging a sale; that he acted as their attorney 
in doing so; that he advaneed the necessary costs 
involved in the patenting and becan1e .a one-fourth 
owner; that he aeted for his eo-o"rners in negoti-
ating a sale of the elai1ns to Colun1bia; that 
!foreton bore a fiduciary relationship to the Hol-
lands and, therefore, o"~ed then1 a duty to make 
a full disclosure of f.acts: that he seen1s to have 
f ollovved a earefully studied plan to coneeal fron1 
the Hollands that he "\Yas getting $287,000 for 
his one-fourth interest, "~hereas, he "\Yas getting 
for then1 only $33,333.33 for each of their one-
fourth interests; that Inean,Yhile he \Yarned the 
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Hollands not to talk to anyone else about the 
matter. 
"The above facts appear from the Hollands' 
testimony and are supported by other circum-
stances shown: that the l~etters (later referred to 
herein) which Mathesius requested and which 
Moreton presented to the Hollands for them to 
sign, carefully avoided any recitation of the price 
per ton or the actual purcha.se price being realized 
from the claims; the fact that when Columbia 
furnished papers handling it as one transaction, 
Moreton returned them and requested two separ-
ate conveyances which would have the effect of 
concealing from the Hollands the full considera-
tion being paid; the fact that the two separate 
conveyances were used and the transaction at 
the closing was so managed that the plaintiffs 
first received their check for $100,000 about which 
they quite naturally would be somewhat elated 
and preoccupied while the Moreton phase of the 
transaction was handled." 
This case went to trial against the individual de-
fendants before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson and 
a jury. At the close of all the evidence the court directed 
a verdict against both plaintiffs, in favor of all the 
individual defendants except Arthur E. Moreton and 
against the administrator and in favor of defendant Mor-
eton (288, 289). The trial court then submitted the cause 
of action of Rex Holland in his individual capacity 
against l\1:oreton to the jury. The jury found in favor 
of Rex and awarded him general damages in the sum of 
$95,833 and punitive damages in the sum of $25,000 
( 277). Thereafter the court set aside the verdict and 
granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict with 
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respect to the cause of action of Rex Holland in his 
individual capacity and entere,d a judgment for defend-
ant Moreton notwithstanding the verdict (292-294). 
NATURE OF THE APPEAL 
This is an appeal from the judgment entered in 
favor of the defendant ~Ioreton and again.st the plaintiff 
Rex Holland in his individual capacity, after the jury 
had rendered judgment in Rex's favor in the sum of 
$95,833 general damages and $25,000 punitive damages, 
from the judgment on the directed verdict entered in 
favor of the defendant )Ioreton and against the plain-
tiff Rex Holland as Administrator with the Will An-
nexed of the Estate of John G. Holland, deceased and 
from the judgment on the directed verdict in favor of 
the other defendants and against both plaintiffs (304, 
305). 
The plain tiff, Rex Holland, in his individual capa-
city, asks the Court to set aside the judgment entered 
against hi1n not\Yithstanding the verdict and to rein-
state the judg1nent in his fayor against ~Ioreton in the 
su1n of $120,833.00 and to add thereto interest on $95,833 
at the rate of 6% per annun1 fron1 the 20th day of De-
eeinber 1948. IIe further asks the court to set aside the 
,iudg1nent on the directed yerdict entered ,against hin1 and 
in favor of the defendants other than :Jioreton and to 
entPr judgn1ent in his fayor against the such defendants 
in a like an1ount or, in the alternatiye~ to grant a new 
trial against such defendants. 
The plaintiff Rex I-Iolland as ...:-\_dininistrator w·ith 
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the Will Annexed of the Estate of John G. Holland, 
Deceased, asks this Court to reverse the· judgn1ent en-
tered on the directed verdict in favor of all defendants 
and to enter judgment in his favor and against the 
defendants in the amount rendered against l\1oreton or 
in the alternative to gr.ant the administrator a new trial. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Rex Holland and John I-Iolland, his father, and one 
1\furie owned three mining clai1ns. The defendant :Th!Iore-
ton, an attorney at law, duly licensed to practice law in 
the State of Utah, fraudulently obtained a one-fourth 
interest in said mining claims. Thereafter, acting as their 
attorney, he negotiated a sale of the property. He fraudu-
lently concealed from the co-owners that the total sale 
price of the property was $387,500.00 .and he fraudulently 
concealed from the co-ovvners the fact that he hin1self 
received $287,500.00 for the one-fourth interest that he 
had fraudulently obtained from the co-owners while each 
of his clients received but $33,333.33 for an undivided 
one-fourth intere.st. 
This is an action for damages against the Moretons 
resulting from attorney Moreton's breach of his confi-
dential relationship with his clients, the Hollands and 
I\1urie, by fraudulently misrepresenting the value of the 
property, by concealing from then1 the total price re-
ceived for the entire property and the amount he re-
ceived for his purported one fourth interest in the prop-
erty and for otherwise overreaching and taking advan-
tage of his clients from the very beginning. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The three prospectors, Rex Holland, his father, John 
Holland (now deeeased), and William C. Murie, jointly 
located the three mining claims known as the M & H 
Claims in 1941 and 1943 (Ex. P-1, P-2 and P-3). These 
men were of trusting disposition and entirely lacking 
in business experience. The transaction involved herein 
was the only sale of mining property with which they 
had ever been connected (526). They not only had no 
idea of what the value of their property was but, addi-
tionally they had no way of determining its value (669). 
(a) 
Attorney Moreton in the spring of 1946 went to 
Cedar City and made arrangements to see the co-owners 
at the Escalante Hotel (331, 332). The inference is that 
he knew a great deal about the potential value of the 
claims which the co-owners did not know and he sent 
for them. 
At this first meeting he proposed an arrangement 
'vhich was accepted by the1n, ''Thereby he \Yas to be their 
attorney in the proceedings to get a p.atent on their prop-
erty and in the sale of their property, and \Yhereby he 
w.as to have an option to patent the property in ·w-hich 
event he was to receiYe a quarter interest in their prop-
erty and also an option to purchase the re1naining three-
fourths interest of the property (333). The agreen1ent 
was reduced to \Yriting by attorney ~Ioreton and signed 
by the co-o,vners ( 333, 334). They \Yere neyer given a 
copy of it and Moreton has never produced a copy of 
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it. His claim is that the document has been lost (335, 
612, 615 ). 
Plaintiff Rex Holland testified as to this first option 
that no time was fixed for its exercise and that no price 
was fixed but that both were left blank in the writing 
prepared by l\{oreton and signed by Rex, his father and 
l\1urie (333, 336). While the defendant Moreton's testi-
mony attempts to contradict this ( 623, 627), the matter 
that is uncontradicted is this: attorney Moreton gave no 
adequate consideration for the option he secured on the 
property ultimately sold for $387,500.00. J\tforeton testi-
fied that the writing, of which he had the only copy and 
vvhich he did not produce ( 615), recited a consideration 
of $1.00, but his attorney objected to a question as to 
'vhether or not even that $1.00 was paid ( 626). 
At this first meeting l\!Ioreton instructed the co-
owners, as he did on every other occasion, not to discuss 
the sale of the property with anyone ( 445). 
On J-uly 5, 1946, Moreton wrote the co-owners again 
jnstructing them not to discuss the sale of the property 
'vith anyone ( 644). His reason, as announced at the 
trial, for giving this instruction, was that it was neces-
sary to protect him ( 645). 
(b) 
On September 1, 1946, Moreton who had done abso-
lutely nothing at all towards getting the claims patented 
(627, 628), came to Cedar City auu on his ple1a that 
he needed more time· (629, 651), had the· option ex-
tended to April 1, 194 7 (Ex. P -4). Again, he gave then1 
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no consideration for this extension and gave them no 
copies of the paper he prepared and had them sign (339, 
340, 657). 
Moreton next went to Cedar City on or about March 
10, 194 7, and he still had done nothing at all in connection 
with patenting the clai1ns except to talk to a surveyor 
( 343, 663) but this time he had his clients sign a letter he 
had previously prepared (341, 345) (Ex. P-8) under 
the terms of which he was to receive a deed to a one-
fourth intere.st in the property inzmediately upon his 
1nerely filing an application for a patent survey. This, 
again, was presented by him ·without an~ consideration 
and represented .a drastic change from the original agree-
ment that provided he "\Vas to get the one-fourth interest 
only \Yhen he actually patented the property. 
It was at this )larch meeting that :Jioreton told the 
co-o\vners that there "\Yere 1,500,000 tons of ore on the 
property (343) but that because of the overburden "we 
could not expect to get n1ore than 10 cents a ton" ( 3-±±). 
l\I ore ton said, further1nore, that they eould probably get 
$13~,000.00 .as an over-all price and of this amount the 
co-o\\Tners \\Tould get $100,000.00, leaving $33,000.00 for 
their la''T~Ter, defendant !Ioreton (344). 
Additionall~~, it appears, that ~foreton "\vas careful 
on this and frequent other occasions to point out that 
it n1ight be pos8ible to get so1nething 1uore than $133,000, 
pP rhap~ as 1nuch as $133,000. ,, ... hile his clients agreed 
that- he eould keep \Yha teYer there n1ight be oYer $133,000, 
it is er)Tstal clear on the record that this \vas on their 
lH~lief induePd by his representations that the price could 
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never 1n any event be more than $155,000.00 ,and the 
overage never more than $22,000 ( 445, 527, 529, 530, 
542, 543). 
(c) 
On or about June, 1947, l\1oreton who still had not 
secured a patent on the property and whose options to 
purchase a three-fourths interest for $100,000.00 had 
expired all unexercised, next prepared another document 
for his clients (Ex. P -5). This one gave him an option 
to purchase the three-fourths interest for $100,000.00, 
payable either in cash or in ten annual payments, with-
out anything for interest. 1foreton testified as to th1s 
option which was for a twelve month period that he 
"overlooked" putting a date on it when he prepared it 
at his office (677, 678) and further, that this new undated 
option represented "quite a little difference in the ori-
ginal proposal" between him and his clients for which 
he was prepared to pay more money than $100,000.00. 
He, of course, never advised his clients of this ( 679) 
vvhen he procured their signatures to the option which 
he admitted he never exercised ( 352, 682). 
In July of 1947 Moreton prepared and procured the 
signatures of the co-owners to .a so-called Agreement 
of Ownership (360-361, 688) to take the place of the 
prior undated option ( 360, Exhibit D-33). This agree-
ment of owner.ship recited that Moreton was to have 
a one-fourth interest in the property and all over $100,-
000 if "said property shall be sold, leased or otherwise 
disposed of on a tonnage basis for .a sum in excess of 
$133,333.33." Additionally and as also provided in the 
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agreement of ownership, he had his clients give him 
on July 23, 1947, a warranty deed for a one-fourth 
interest ( 691, 692, Exhibit P -6). Moreton confessed at 
the trial that in view of the fact that he had not secured 
a patent on the property he had not earned that one-
fourth interest (701, 702) and that the agreement of 
ownership rep·resented a considerable deviation from the 
option in that under the agreement of ownership he was 
not required to put up $100,000 or get anyone else to 
put up $100,000, and that further, there was no time 
limit in the agreement of ownership as to \Yhen anything 
had to be done (698). 
From his own testimony it is clear he never advised 
his clients of the significance of any of the documents 
they signed and (except for purported tax considerations 
which clearly appear to have been an afterthought) the 
only reason he gave at the trial for having them sign 
the documents of July 23, 1947, was that he "preferred 
to have it that way to evidence 1ny ozc1wrship as a matter 
of record" ( 695). In any event, the property w.as neither 
sold, lea:sed or other,Yise disposed of on a tonnage basis 
so as to fall 'vithin the tern1s of the agreement of o\vner-
ship. 
l[oreton next prepared and filed the application for 
patent August 25, 1947 (Ex. P-1:2). He also prepared 
the other papers necessary to be signed by the co-owners 
(Ex. P-13). 
(d) 
On September 14, 1948, R.ex Holland had a chance 
tneeting with one Parley Canfield on the street (381). 
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Canfield, who had been a total stranger to Rex ( 368), 
n1entioned that there were 3,500,000 tons of ore in the 
l\t1 & H claims and iron ore had been bringing 25 cents 
a ton (381, 382). Since Moreton had told them there 
were only 1,500,000 tons of ore in the M & H and the 
price was only 10 cents a ton, Rex didn't knovv what to 
think ( 446), so that night he wrote this letter (Ex. P-14) 
to Dr. Walther Mathe.sius, President of Columbia, hoping 
that Mathesius would advise him. 
Mathesius took the letter to Attorney Moreton and 
discussed it with him (717, 786), but neither of them 
answered it or ever at any time mentioned it to Rex or 
the other co-owners ( 438-439, 526-527). 
In the meantime Canfield admitted to Rex that he 
had been mistaken .as to the tonnage contained in the 
~I & H claims (383) and that he had been talking about 
son1ebody else's claims ( 382, 383). Rex had been told 
by Moreton that while some iron ore would bring 25 
cents a ton, the iron ore in the 1f & H claims could only 
bring about 10 cents a ton because of the size of the 
overburden ( 344). Rex concluded that since Canfield 
had been entirely "\Vrong .as to the amount of tonnage, 
that therefore Canfield's price information was not appli-
cable to the M & H claims and that Moreton had advised 
the co-owners correctly on the tonnage and the price 
(385). Rex's confidence in Moreton was now restored 
( 527). I-Iis belief in everything that Moreton had said in 
the past w.as confirmed and he believed everything that 
Moreton said thereafter ( 540). For that reason Rex 
never asked ~1oreton how much he (Moreton) was get-
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ting for his (Moreton's) one-fourtl1 interest or how much 
was being obtained for the entire property (527, 528). 
(e) 
The record establishes that Moreton was dealing with 
Mathesius before April of 1946 (831, 857, Letter of 
July 5, 1946, set out at 982). However, ~Ioreton free-
ly admitted that his first discussion 'vith :Jfathesius 
concerning the price which Columbia would pay for the 
~I & H claims occurred at a meeting between nioreton and 
~Iathesius in l\1oreton's office on Ocotber 8, 1948 (784). 
At this meeting, nlathesius stated that since Colum-
bia had acquired the ~Iilner claims it would be interested 
in leasing the ~f & H properties. :Jiathesius asked l\Iore-
ton ·\vhat the ore \vas worth and he replied that it was 
\vorth 25 cents a ton. ~Iathesius readily agreed to this 
price ( 784, 785). 
A few days after October 8, :Jiathesius and :Jioreton 
had a telephone conversation in \Yhich they agreed that 
the~ tonnage basis \Yould be 1.55 1nillion tons (794). Ac-
cording to Thioreton, the entire .. negotiations" consisted 
of 38 \Vords ( 789). J[athesius told :Jioreton that Colmn-
bia "\vould pay :25 rents a ton based upon Colzunbia's esti-
Inate of the tonnage and :Jioreton ans"~ered that that was 
agreeable "Tith hin1 (789). 
It is no,vhere eYen rlain1ed by anyone that there ",.ere 
(\YPr an~T separate negotiations covering either the three-
fourth~ intPrPst of the eo-o,vners or the one-fourth inter-
est of l\1oreton. 
(f) 
After l\tathPtdus and l\Ioreton had agreed upon a 
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total price of $387,500 Columbia sent to Moreton a single 
document containing the offer of sale for the entire prop-
erty by all four co-ovvners for a total sum of $387,500 
(551, 769). This use of a single document was in accord-
ance with the standard practice of Columbia when they 
·were dealing for property owned by more than one per-
son (549). 
Moreton, however, advised Colmnbia that he wanted 
the transaction embodied, not in a single document, but in 
two sets of documents : one to cover the sale of the three-
fourths interest of his clients at a price of $100,000 and 
the other to cover the sale of his one-fourth interest for 
$287,500.00 (551, 771). 
Additionally, 11oreton, in compliance with the prior 
request of M.athesius, procured the signature of his clients 
to Exhibit P-19 dated October 13, 1948 (388). In this 
document the tonnage is referred to as 1.5 million tons but 
there is nothing in it with respect to the total price or the 
price per ton which is to be paid ( 771). 
Columbia agreed to l\1oreton's request that they 
abandon their standard practice of using a single docu-
ment embodying the offers of all four owners and instead 
e1nployed two sets of documents, one covering the offer 
of Moreton's clients and the other covering the ~ale of 
Th1:oreton's one-fourth interest .alone ( 551). Thereupon 
~Ioreton proceeded to procure the signature of his clients 
to another document dated October 16, 1948, prepared by 
him and stating that the co-owners were satisfied with the 
sum of $100,000 and that Moreton could sell his interest 
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for whatever price Columbia and he could agree upon 
( 780, Exhibit P -16). 
On November 20th, still another letter was prepared 
by Moreton (Exhibit P-17) and presented to his clients 
for their signatures (794, 795). It stated that it was no 
concern of theirs as to when, to whom, at what price or 
upon what terms Moreton may sell his interest. Again, as 
in the letters of October 13th and 16th, notwithstanding 
that all matters of price covering both Moreton's interest 
and his clients' interest had been clearly and completely 
resolved, the document which Moreton induced his clients 
to sign was so misleadingly worded as to make it appear 
that the matter of price was still for future determination. 
It further appears that originally :\Ioreton and :Jia-
thesius had agreed that the purchase b~~ Columbia would 
be handled under an escrow agreement and that this ar-
rangement "\vas abandoned (791, 792). Of course, had the 
transaction been handled by escrow all parties would 
have been fully inforn1ed as to all matters, including the 
total price paid and the .amount received by defendant 
i\foreton. 
(g) 
On Decen1ber 19, 1948, the co-o\vners received a tele-
granl from ~Ioreton requesting that they come to Salt 
Lake. On Decen1ber ~0~ 1948, they presented themselves 
at l\loreton'.s office ( 39~). Dr. ~I a thesius and ~fr. Heald 
of Columbia arrived. Heald turned oYer some papers to 
l\1 ore ton 'vho then read the deed conyeying the interest 
of the co-owners to Colu1nbia. The co-o"~lH~rs then affixed 
their signatures to a receipt (393). 
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There was nothing said at this meeting about the 
a1nount of money that Moreton was to received for his 
interest. There was no mention of a figure of $387,500 
nor of a figure of $287,500. No revenue stamps were 
put on the deeds at that time (395). 
We realize that there is .a conflict of evidence in this 
matter, but the evidence must be viewed in its light most 
favorable to plaintiffs and both Rex Holland ( 393-399) 
and Clara I-Iolland ( 933-939) testified concerning this 
matter as above outlined. Rex and his mother both testi-
fied that at the final meeting of December 20, 1948, 
neither 1foreton, Mathesius, nor anyone else informed 
them of the contract betvveen Columbia and Moreton 
covering the sale of 1v1oreton's purported one-fourth 
interest and the amount Columbia was paying Moreton 
for his purported one-fourth interest and also the a1nount 
Columbia was p.aying for the entire property; and that 
Ivforeton also concealed the revenue stamps which were 
to be attached to the separate deeds covering the interest 
of Moreton and the interests of the co-owners. 
This testi1nony is of particular significance in vie\v 
of the fact that l\foreton testified that he and Mathesius 
had agreed in October of 1948 that the co-owners vvere to 
be fully informed as to the total price being paid and as to 
the price paid for 1\Ioreton's interest, at the closing of the 
transaction on Dec. 20, 1948 (777-780, 812). It would ap-
pear obvious, of course, that neither l\foreton nor Mathe-
sius would have felt the need for any such arr.angements 
except for the fact that they were both fully aware of the 
ignorance of the co-owners as to the true situation. Thus 
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it is both express and implicit on the record in this case 
that all parties were aware that the co-owners did not 
know the true _situation prior to December 20, 1948, and 
of course, the testimony of the co-owners which the jury 
had a right to believe and did believe and \vhich is to be 
treated for the purposes of this appeal as conclusive, \Vas 
that they were not informed on December 20, 1948. 
Although because of the confidential relationship 
which existed between the parties, it is not necessary to 
show reliance by Rex and his father, John Holland, on 
Moreton's representations the testimony and evidence at 
the trial (395-399), was that had Rex known Moreton 
was receiving $287,500 for his interest or that the ore 
\vas being sold at twenty-five cents per ton or that the 
entire property was worth $387,500, he would not have 
signed the offers to sell the ~·~ interest for $100,000 (Ex-
hibit P-15), the letter of October 16 (Exhibit P-16), the 
letter of October 13 (Exhibit P -:~1) ~ the letter of ~{ ovein-
ber 20 (Exhibit P-17), or the ,,~arranty deed (Exhibit 
P -22) ; that he \Yould not have accepted the check and that 
he \vould not have signed the receipt for the check fro1n 
Colun1bia (P-21) or signed the statutory deed to Columbia 
(Exhibit P -:2:2) or the "~arr.anty deed to ~Ioreton (Exhibit 
P-7). 
It ,,T,as, of course, ~Ioreton ~s duty to tell Rex and the 
C0-0\\Tner8 the~e things. n[oreton at the trial, after days 
of Pva~ion, finally broke do\\~n under exrunination and 
adn1itted that he nP, ... (~r told the co-o\vners ho\Y 1nuch he 
\\'as getting for the propert~ ... (51-±, lines ~-±-30): 
uQ. (I3~T ~lr. Pollack) ''Till you llO\Y telline \Yhen 
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it was that you told the Hollands and Murie, 
for the very first time, that Columbia was 
paying 25 cents a ton for the M&H claims~ 
A. I never told them that at any time. 
Q. You never told them? 
A. No." 
(h) 
Three years later it vvas discovered ancl it is no\v 
admitted that Moreton sold the entire property for $387,-
500 and that he received for the one-fourth interest which 
he had fraudulently procured, $287,500.00 ( 400, 401). 
It is manifest on the record that the confidential re-
lationship existing between 11oreton and the Hollands 
continued at least up until the time of the actual discovery 
of his fraud and that appears from the fact that when 
J-ohn Holland died on October 9, 1949, 1vforeton \vas em-
ployed by the Hollands to act as attorney for them and 
the estate of John Holland and that he accepted that 
e1nployment and continued in it until finally after the 
actual discovery of the fraud by Rex I-Iolland, he was 
discharged ( 940). 
Rex first learned that the property had been sold 
for $387,500 in October of 1951 ( 400). l-Ie was .at the 
home of Bishop Parson U. Webster of Cedar City. Can-
field stated that theM & II Claims had brought $387,000. 
Rex was shocked to learn of this total price and after he 
considered for some time he wrote l\ir. Moreton ( 401). 
The letter he wrote was introduced as Exhibit P-21. In 
this letter he reminds Moreton that Moreton had lead 
them to believe that there was 1.6 million tons of good 
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grade iron ore for which the steel company would pay 
the owners 10 cents per ton. This was the first time that 
the plaintiff, Rex, had learned of the fraud which had 
been perpetrated upon him by his lawyer Moreton. 
~1oreton answered Rex by a letter of December 18, 
1951 (Ex. P-25) in which l\foreton threatened to put Rex 
in jail if Rex pursued the matter any further. Copy of 
this letter was attached to plaintiff's amended complaint 
( 43) and was, of cour.se, introduced in evidence at the 
trial. There is no clearer indicia of 1foreton's fraud in 
this case than his answer to Rex's letter. It not only gives 
a clear indication of Moreton's guilt and his knowledge 
of his guilt, but it also indicates 1Ioreton knew he was 
dealing with simple naive people. 
Rex went to the U.S. Attorney in Salt Lake City 
to determine "\vhether he had violated the law in asking 
Moreton for an adjustment (Ex. P-26, P-68). The U. S. 
Attorney advised him of his rights and he then employed 
counsel. Rex's counsel then wrote to Moreton requesting 
information regarding the details of the transaction. 
Hovvever, Moreton refused to furnish the information 
( 531). After the investigation of this case "\Yas begun 
by plaintiff's attorney, l\foreton began to "loan" ~furie 
(one of the co-owners) $250.00 every single n1onth up to 
at least the ti1ne of the trial. 
(i) 
Rex Holland is suing as the administrator of the Es-
tate of his father John Holland, and Rex Holland is .also 
a plaintiff in his individual capacity. 
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This is a brief resume of the testimony in this case 
and our intention is by it to give the Court a general 
background of this case. As we deal with the specific 
points involved we will go more into detail. Additionally, 
for the convenience of the Court, we are collecting in a 
separate pamphlet the testimony at the trial pertaining 
to each of several points as to which we feel the Court 
will want to be fully informed. 
STATE1vfENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
THE EXISTENCE OF A CONFIDENTIAL RELATION-
SHIP BETWEEN MORETON AND THE HOLLANDS WAS 
ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
POINT II. 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF WAS UPON MORETON TO 
ESTABLISH BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
THAT THE CO-OWNERS WERE FULLY INFORIV1ED OF 
ALL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE TRANSACTION, THAT 
THE TRANSACTION BETWEEN HIM AND THE CO-
OvVNERS WAS FAIR AND EQUITABLE AND THAT NO AD-
VANTAGE OF THE CO-OWNERS WAS TAKEN BY HIM. 
POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE IS CONCLUSIVE THAT MORETON 
DID NOT MAKE THE NECESSARY DISCLOSURE, THAT HE 
MISREPRESENTED THE PRICE, THAT HE CONCEALED 
THE PRICE AND THAT THE TRANSACTION WAS UNFAIR 
AND THAT HE TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE CO-OWNERS. 
POINT IV. 
THE EVIDENCE IS CONCLUSIVE THAT MORETON'S 
F AlLURE TO MAKE THE DISCLOSURE CONCERNING PUR-
CHASE PRICE WAS WILFUL AND DELIBERATE. 
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POINT V. 
AS A MATTER OF LAW THE STATUTE OF LIMITA-
TIONS HAD NOT RUN AT THE TIME THIS ACTION WAS 
COlVIMENCED. 
POINT VI. 
REX HOLLAND AS ADJ\1INISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE 
OF JOHN HOLLAND HAD STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO 
BRING THIS ACTION AND DID NOT NEED SPECIFIC 
COURT AUTHORITY. 
POINT VII. 
IN REINSTATING THE JUDGMENT THIS COURT 
SHOULD ORDER THAT INTEREST BE ADDED THEREON 
FROM THE 20TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1948, TO DATE OF 
FINAL ENTRY OF JUDGMENT. 
POINT VIII. 
JUDGMENT SHOULD BE ENTERED IN FAVOR OF 
THE ESTATE IN THE SUM OF $120,833.00. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EXISTENCE OF A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIO:t-~­
SHIP BETWEEN MORETON AND THE HOLLANDS WAS 
ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
There can be no question about the fact that the de-
fendant ~loreton \Yas .acting as the attorney and agent 
for the other eo-O\\'"ners. He agreed to act as their attor-
ney in obtaining a patent upon the I\f&H Clain1s and in 
Helling the clain1s. \V e sub1uit that under the evidence 
in this case this confidential relationship appears as .a 
1natter of la-\v. 
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Re~ Holland testified as follows ( 337) : 
"Q. Was there anything else said in the conver-
sation about what he was going to do, or vvhat 
you shouldn't do, or anything of that kind~ 
A. He told us at that time, that he, when we start-
ed on this patent, that he vvould be our attor-
ney, that he would be our attorney in getting 
the patent, and that he would also be our 
attorney in the sale of these properties." 
Moreton never denied that he had so told the co-
owners. 
Every do cum en t used in the transaction between 
lvforeton .and the co-owners wa.s prepared by 1\foreton 
and presented to the co-owners. Never, at any time, did 
they refuse to sign any document vvhich 1foreton placed 
before them. The documents so signed present an im-
pressive list: 
1. The original agreen1ent signed in the spring of 
1946. (This document was never produced by 
nioreton and the co-owners did not have a copy 
thereof.) 
2. The extension of the option and agreement to 
give an undivided one-fourth interest for patent-
ing (Ex. P-4). 
3. The undated option (Ex. P-5). 
4. The agreement of ownership (Ex. P-6). 
5. Warranty deed conveying one-fourth interest 
to Moreton (Exhibit P-7). 
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6. Letter of understanding (Exhibit P-8). 
7. Power of attorney and authority to act (Exhibit 
P-18). 
8. Re-amended location certificate (Exhibit P-9). 
9. Amended location certificate (Exhibit P-10). 
10. Application for Patent (Exhibit P-12). 
11. Three affidavits of citizenship (Exhibit P -13). 
12. Letter of October 13, 1948 (Exhibit P-19). 
13. Letter of October 16, 1948 (Exhibit P-16). 
14. Letter of November 20, 1948 (Exhibit P-17). 
15. Offer of October 16, 1948 (Exhibit P-15). 
All of these documents affected the legal relations 
existing between the co-o"\vners, the government and Co-
lumbia. They are the type of documents about which a 
person would .seek legal advice and in preparing these 
and presenting them to the co-owners for signature there 
can be no question but \Yhat l\{oreton \vas acting as their 
attorney. He is an attorney of long standing in the State 
of Utah. The co-owners looked to him as their attorney 
and he should not be per1nitted to no\Y say that he was not 
acting in his profe.ssional capacity. The co-owners had 
no other attorney fro1n \Yhon1 they obtained advice. 
The closing of the transaction occurred in the office 
of Moreton, the attorney (392). He there read to then1 
the documents relating to the transfer of the interest of 
the co-owners to Colu1nbia. He presented the documents 
to the1n for their signature. In1plicit in his conduct was 
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his advice that these documents were proper for them 
to sign and would properly effectuate the intention and 
desires of the parties. Here again, he was acting as the 
.attorney for these people in effecting an eventual transfer 
of their interest in the mining clain1s to Columbia. 
He, in addition, acted as the agent of the co-owners 
in negotiating the sale of the l\f & H mining claims. l\1a-
thesius dealt with no one but Moreton. As a matter of 
fact, when Rex wrote the letter of September 14, 1948, to 
Mathesius, Mathesius refused to "go around" J.\!Ioreton 
and took up the contents of the letter with him. Mr. 
l\foreton on every occasion that he talked with Rex and 
his father cautioned them not to talk with anybody about 
the terms of this deal ( 445). l-Ie not only cautioned them 
orally, but in a letter (Ex. D-33) he advised John Holland 
"however, let me caution you again to leave the entire 
bargaining .and selling of the_se properties to me as 
agreed upon." 
Further proof of the continued existence of the con-
fidential relationship is found in the evidence that after 
John I-Iolland died on October 9, 1949, the Holland family 
employed ~A:oreton to handle John's estate. He continued 
as attorney of record until the summer of 1953 ( 940). 
The foregoing facts are admitted by all parties con-
cerned and we submit that this confidential relationship 
between the Hollands and Moreton was established as a 
matter of law. In any event, the jury, under Instruction 
No. 6, found that this relationship existed. Certainly 
there can be no dispute that at least a question of fact 
'vas presented on this matter and the court could not con-
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elude as a matter of law that there was no confidential 
relationship existing between the.se parties. 
POINT II. 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF WAS UPON MORETON TO 
ESTABLISH BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
THAT THE CO-OWNERS WERE FULLY INFORMED OF 
ALL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE TRANSACTION, THAT 
THE TRANSACTION BETWEEN HIM AND THE CO-
OWNERS WAS FAIR AND EQUITABLE AND THAT NO AD-
VAN·TAGE OF THE CO-OWNERS WAS TAKEN BY HIM. 
Utah cases clearly require that where the existence 
of a confidential relationship is established that any 
transaction between the parties, in order to be upheld 
when questioned by the confidant, must he shown to haYe 
been fair and equitable, that no advantage has been taken 
of him .and that he was fully infor1ned of all matters 
relative to the transaction. The burden of establishing 
these propositions is placed upon the advisor. This is 
particularly true where the relationship of attorney and 
client is shovvn to exist. The attorney is under a duty 
to n1ake all of these disclosures and showings and if 
his conduct is ever called into question he has the burden 
of establishing these propositions by a preponderance of 
the evidence. 
In Omega Investnlcllt Co. r. TT-roolley, ~~ lTtah -±74, 
271 Pac. 797, the relationship of attorney and client \Yas 
involved. In addition the defendant attorney acted in 
son1e ways as an agent of plaintiff. In that case shares 
of stock h.ad been transferred to the defendant attorney. 
rrhe trial court ordered hiln to re-convey the stock to 
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plaintiff. This Court affirmed. The Court concluded, as 
it must be concluded in the case at bar: 
"There can be no question but that the trial 
court was justified in drawing the conclusion that 
a fiduciary relation existed between Baldwin and 
Woolley at the time the stock in question in this 
case was transferred. In fact, no other conclusion 
can reasonably be drawn." 
The Court, in discussing the law, then stated: 
"The confidential relation being shown to 
exist, the burden devolved upon Woolley to show 
that, in the making of the transaction, the fullest 
and fairest explanation and co1nmunication was 
made to Baldwin of every particular in Woolley's 
breast; that the transaction itself was fair, and 
the consideration paid therefor adequate, before 
a court is justified in permitting the transaction 
to stand." 
The Court again stated: 
"Whether '"'"voolley had inforn1ation at that 
time, that Baldwin did not have, of facts that 
tended to enhance the value of the property, can-
not be told. The burden under the authorities 
vvas upon Woolley to show that he made a full 
.and fair disclosure of all facts within his knowl-
edge to Baldwin and that Baldwin entered into 
the agreement freely and fully advised." 
* * * * * * * * * * 
"Not only was the burden placed upon Woolley 
to show a full and fair disclosure of all facts with-
in his knowledge, but it was also his duty to show 
that the transaction was f.air and equitable, and 
that the consideration paid was adequate.'' 
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* * * 
"All of the instruments relied on by th·e de-
fendant as the consideration for the transfer 
of the stock were executed while the relation of 
confidence existed between the parties, and are 
burdened with the presumption that they were 
executed as a re.sult of undue influence and fr.aud 
without full disclosure of all facts known by 
Woolley, and without an adequate consideration. 
The same thing is true with reference to the 
infringement contract and all other transactions 
between these parties during the year 1924. No 
attempt w.as made to overcome the presumption." 
In the recent case of In Re Swan's Estate, 4 Utah 
2d 277, 293 P. 2d 682, wherein an attorney was involved, 
the Court reaffirmed the rule of the Omega case. In 
discussing the effect of the presumption arising from 
the existence of a confidential relationship, the Court 
stated: 
"Since this presumption has the ·effect of 
shifting the burden of persuasion that these lega-
cies were not induced by fraud or undue influence, 
then in determining wheth-er the findings of the 
trial court are sustained by the evidence, \Ye n1ust 
assume that there was fraud or undue influence 
unles.s the trial court is convinced that no fraud 
or undue influence \Yas exercised, or unless the 
evidence to that effect is so strong and convincing 
that a finding to the contrary would be unreason-
able. This is the rule that \Ve apply in this case 
and the rule required by Rule 14(a) of the Uni-
forin Rules, and under it, the findings of the trial 
court must be .affir1ned." 
The Court concluded as follo,vs: 
"After careful study and consideration 've 
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conclude that this presumption shifts the burden 
onto the confidential adviser of persuading or 
convincing the fact finder by a preponderance of 
the evidence that no fraud or undue influence 
was exerted, or in other words, he has the burden 
of convincing the fact finder from the evidence 
that it is more probable that he acted perfectly 
fair with his confidant; that he made complete 
disclosure of all material information available 
and took no unfair advantage of his superior posi-
tion than that he exerted fraud or undue influence 
to obtain the benefits in question." 
The Court considered a situation where there is no 
evidence contr.ary to that produced tending to show that 
the confidential adviser had made the necessary dis-
closures. The Court stated: 
"Such a finding is made ag.ainst the party 
who fails to satisfy his burden even though there 
is no evidence to the contrary. In other words, 
the court must find the facts against a party who 
fails to satisfy his burden and such finding does 
not have to be supported by positive evidence." 
vV e submit that the burden of persuasion was upon 
defendant Moreton to convince the finder of f.act by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the transaction be-
tween hirnself and the co-owners and the ultimate sharing 
of the proceeds of the s.ale of the M & I-I Claims to 
Columbia was fair and equitable, that he took no ad-
vant.age of them and that he at all times kept them fully 
informed as to all matters relative to the transaction. 
POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE IS CONCLUSIVE THAT MORETON 
DID NOT MAKE THE NECESSARY DISCLOSURE, THAT HE 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
MISREPRESENTED THE PRICE, THAT HE CONCEALED 
THE PRICE AND THAT THE TRANSA,CTION WAS UNFAIR 
AND THAT HE TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE CO-OWNERS. 
Under the authorities set forth in Point II even if 
the testimony of Moreton disclosed that he had made 
the necessary disclosures, the case should have been 
submitted to a jury for its determination of whether or 
not that testimony had convinced the jury by a prepond-
er.ance of the evidence that ~Ioreton had made full dis-
closures of the price and terms of the sale which he 
negotiated. Such is the direct language of this Court in 
the last quotation under Point II. However, in this case 
there is positive testimony that Moreton at no time made 
the disclosures required by the rule and the evidence 
establishes that the contract was not fair and equitable 
.and the evidence further discloses that l\Ioreton did take 
advantage of the Hollands. 
As early a.s 1\iarch, 1947, ~Ioreton told the Hollands 
that because of the overburden they could not expect 
to get more than 10 cents a ton for the ore. He told then1 
at that ti1ne that he thought he could get an overall 
price of $133,000.00 (3-!-!). He reiterated this statement 
in June of 19-! 7 ( 358). The .agree1nent of o'vnership (Ex-
hibit P-6) substantiates this nrisrepresentation. It men-
tions therein that the conten1plated selling price of the 
1nining clai1ns was $133,333.33. The approxi1nate tonnage 
,vhieh had been .spoken of 'Yas 1,500,000 ( 3-±3, 358). The 
Hollands were never told anything different so far ns 
price is concerned. l\Ioreton hilnself adn1itted that he 
did not tell I-Iollands the price "Then he testified ( 83:2): 
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"Q. Will you now tell rne when it was that you 
told the Hollands and Murie, for the very 
first time, that Columbia was paying 25 cents 
a ton for the M & H claims 1 
A. I never told them that at any time. 
Q. You never told them 1 
A. No." 
The evidence is clea.r that in consu1nn1a ting this sale 
the Hollands relied upon Moreton's statement that they 
could not expect to get more than 10 cents for the ore 
because of the depth of the overburden (528). The Hol-
lands never did knovv that Moreton was getting $287,500, 
or that the total price was $387,500. Both Rex and his 
mother testified that at the meeting where the transaction 
-vvas consummated there was no disclosure of the total 
a1nount of the purchase price or the amount which More-
ton was to receive (395, 933-939). Hence, \Ve have testi-
Inony which definitely would support a finding that 
disclosure was not made of the price which was to be 
received. As originally prepared, the final papers were 
drafted so that there would be but one group of papers 
to cover the entire transaction ( 549, 550, 551). Subse-
quently, at 1foretons behest, this method of closing the 
trans.action vvas abandoned and it was arranged for two 
separate sets of papers to be drawn, one covering the 
one-fourth undivided interest of Moreton and the other 
set covering the undivided three-fourth interest of the 
co-owners. It was never disclosed to the co-owners why 
the transaction was handled in this manner. Nothing wa::, 
ever said to them about the original documents whereill 
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the entire transaction was placed in one set of documents. 
The obvious reason for this division was to enable More-
ton ·.to sell lhis 1interest without disclosure of what he 
received or what the total purchase price was. 
Moreton concealed the fact that he knew of Rex~s 
letter of September 14, 1948 to Mathesius (526, 527). 
However, this letter had been shown to Moreton by 
Mathesius as early as October 8, 1948 (784-788). By 
virtue of this letter, Mathesius required the statements 
contained in the letter_s of October 16 and November 20 
wherein the co-owners replied that they were satisfied 
with the $100,000 for the three-fourths interest and that 
it was of no concern of theirs how much Moreton received 
for his interest (764, 765). No disclosure was ever made 
of the reason for these documents and the co-owners 
.signed them without question \vhen prepared and pre-
sented to them by Moreton. 
l\{oreton never did reveal to the co-o\vners the con-
tent of the conversations which he had ·with ~Iathesius in 
order that they would be fully infor1ned upon all phases 
of the transaction wherein Moreton was acting as their 
attorney. The evidence, without dispute, clearly estab-
lishes that the transaction bet,veen )foreton and the 
I-Iolland.s was not fair and equitable and the evidence 
discloses without question that Moreton took advantage 
of the co-owners. The result of this transaction points 
indubitably to the fact that l\Ioreton over-reaehed the 
co-owners .and took advantage of his confidential rela-
tionship with the1n to acco1nplish this result. He so ar-
ranged and finagled this transaction that he received 
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$287,500 for his undivided one-fourth interest and each 
of the other co-owners received $33,333.33 for his un-
divided one-fourth interest. 
We submit that not only did Moreton fail to sustain 
the burden of proof which rested upon him, but the evi-
dence clearly would require a finding that he had breach-
ed his confidential relationship with them and thereby 
became liable to respond in damages for that breach 
of confidential relationship. Under the authorities the 
presumption alone would justify and support a finding 
against 1foreton in favor of both Rex and John In re 
Swan's Estate, supra. 
POINT IV. 
THE EVIDENCE IS CONCLUSIVE THAT MORETON'S 
FAILURE TO MAKE THE DISCLOSURE CONCERNING PUR-
CHASE PRICE WAS WILFUL AND DELIBERATE. 
This case was sub1nitted to the jury upon the prin-
ciples set forth in 2 Restatement of the Law of Agency, 
Section 469, wherein it is stated: 
"An agent is entitled to no compensation for 
conduct which is disobedient or is a breach of his 
duty of loyalty; such conduct, if constituting a 
wilful and deliberate breach of his contract of 
service, disentitles him to compensation for even 
properly performed services for "\vhich no com-
pensation is apportioned." 
The comment to this section, so far as material here, 
is as follows: 
"An agent is entitled to no compensation for a 
service which constitutes a violation of the agent's 
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duties of obedience, stated in § 385. This is true 
although the disobedience results in no substantial 
harm to the principal's interests, and although 
the agent believes that he is justified in so acting. 
Language expressing insubordination as well as 
disobedience acts may be sufficient to prevent the 
agent from being entitled to recover compensation 
for conduct of which the words are a part. 
"b. A serious violation of a duty of loyalty 
or seriously disobedient conduct is a wilful and 
deliberate breach of the contract of service by 
the .agent, and in accordance with the rule stated 
in § 456, the agent thereby loses his right to obtain 
compensation for prior services, compensation for 
which has not been apportioned." 
* * * * * * * * * * 
"If the principal, in ignorance of the agent's 
faulty conduct, pays to the agent compensation or 
indemnity to which he is not entitled, the principal 
can maintain an action to recover the amount." 
In speaking of a similar situation, this Court in 
Reich v. Christopulos, 123 Utah 137, 266 P2d 238, stated: 
"In undertaking the sale of the pro~Jerty for 
the Reiches, Hill had a duty to represent their 
interest in good faith, to discharge it "\Yith reason-
able skill and diligence and to disclose to them 
all pertinent facts ".,.hich "\Yould n1aterially affect 
their interest ... A .. s is noted in An1erican Jurispru-
dence, ( ± A1n. Jur. 1067, Brokers Sec. 1-±2): 
" tThe faithful disch.arge of his duties is a 
condition precedent to any recovery upon the part 
of a broker for the seryiees he has rendered his 
principal. Thus, he is not entitled to con1pensation 
if he fails to disrlose to his principal any personal 
knowledge "~hich he possesses relative to 1natters 
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which are or may be material to his employer's 
interests * * .' " 
See also Baird v. Madsen, 57 Cal. App. 2d 465, 134 
P. 2d 885. 
The evidence in this case establishes that Moreton's 
breach of his confidential relationship was wilful and 
deliberate in misrepresenting the price to be paid and in 
concealing the price paid by Columbia for all three 
n1ining claims and the .amount which he received for his 
share. Moreton started out by representing that because 
of the overburden the n1ost that could be received was 
10 cents per ton. He never did tell them any differently 
from this even though he knew that its value was greatly 
in excess of this figure. The first time that any mention 
of price is n1ade is after the Bureau of 1_\lfines report 
dated ~lay, 1947 (Exhibit D-37). This was in June of 
1.947 when the undated -vvritten option (Exhibit P-5) -vvas 
prepared and presented to the co-owners for signature 
by JYioreton. They readily signed the document. Later 
he figured the best -vvay to handle the matter was to 
enter into an agreeraent of ownership. This agreement 
sho-vved that the contemplated price would be approxi-
n1ately $133,333.33, but -vvith the understanding that there 
might be some excess but it was the understanding of 
the co-owners that this excess would not be more than 
in the neighborhood of $22,000 putting the tonnage and 
price at 1,500,000 and 10 cents ( 542). 
The patent application was not prepared until 
August 25, 1957. On September 14, 1948, Rex wrote a 
letter to Mathesius concerning the sale of the M&H claims 
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and requested a reply from M.athesius (E¥.llibit P-14). 
l\fathesuis did not contact Rex, but on or about October 
8, took the matter up with Moreton (784). Moreton never 
did contact the Hollands concerning this letter. He 
absolutely disregarded the fact that Rex at least was 
contending he was entitled to a full one-fourth share. 
Moreton proceeded to arr.ange things so that he could 
obtain the $287,500 for his undivided one-quarter interest 
without disclosing this to the co-owners. He refused to 
permit the transaction to be closed with only one docu-
ment disclo_sing the total purchase price (771). He ar-
ranged to have the documents in two sets, one for his 
interest ; the other for the co-owners interest. At the 
time of the closing of the transaction on December 20 
it was arranged so that there would be no disclosure 
to the co-owners of either the amount paid to him or 
the documents relating to the sale of his interest. He 
had the co-owners sign the two letters of October 16, 
1948 (Exhibit P-16) and of November 20, 1948 (Exhibit 
P -17). These letters denote a studied avoidance of dis-
closing the amount he 'vas to receiYe for his interest. 
These documents only disclose the amount to be received 
by the co-owner.s. The amount to Moreton is not dis-
closed. It also would appear from these documents that 
the amount which Moreton 'vas to receive for his share 
had not yet been agreed upon. As .a n1atter of fact the 
record discloses that this 1natter had been detern1ined 
as early as October 8, 19-±S. A letter dated October 15, 
1948 (Exhibit P-43) discloses that the original proposal 
for sale for $387,500 'Yns trans1nitted to l\foreton. It 
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states that this proposal is pursuant to an earlier con-
versation of Octo her 9, 1948. All of this conduct on the 
part of Moreton show.s without question that he was 
intentionally and deliberately concealing and failing to 
disclose the price and terms of the s.ale of the M & H 
claims. 
We submit that a court could rule that his conduct 
was intentional and deliberate as a matter of law, but 
certainly the foregoing conduct would support a finding 
on the part of a jury that his conduct in this connection 
w.as intentional and deliberate within the rule announced 
by the authorities cited under this poirit. 
POINT V. 
AS A MATTER OF LAW THE STATUTE OF LIMITA-
TIONS HAD NOT RUN AT THE TIME THIS ACTION WAS 
COMMENCED. 
(a) 
It should be noted initially that in this case there 
was never at any time any duty upon any of the co-
owners to make any inquiry as to the facts and circum-
stances surrounding the transaction; throughout the 
trans.action a confidential relationship existed which war-
ranted and justified them in relying completely on their 
attorney, the defendant Moreton, and further, there never 
was at any time available to them any means of which 
they knew of discovering the correct purchase price from 
any persons other than the defendant Moreton .and Col-
Uinbia, both of whom, when Rex made inquiry, failed 
to divulge the information. 
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At least up to October 8, 1948, no price had been 
agreed upon between Moreton and Columbia for the sale 
of the property. Therefore, it must be concluded that 
up to that time at least, no inquiry of any kind could 
h.ave ever revealed the amount of the purchase price. 
The remarks of Parley Canfield, a total stranger to the 
transaction, to Rex on September 14, therefore, bore no 
relation to the transaction itself and while they mo:tn2::.}-
tarily disturbed Rex, it must be borne in mind that 
when shortly thereafter Rex discovered that Parley Can-
field w.as mistaken, his confidence in his attorney 1Iore-
ton was justifiably, fully and completely restored. 
The letter of Septeinber 14, 1948, from Rex to Math-
esius based on this first conversation with Canfield \Yas 
\Vritten three months before the transaction \vas closed. 
It, of course, had absolutely nothing whatever to do with 
the running of the statute of limitations. By the time the 
sale was concluded the letter had dissipated itself. The 
co-owners continued to follow ~Ioreton's advice and ac-
cept his statements and sign \vhatever he presented to 
them. The confidence of the co-owners \vas continuing. 
They proceeded with the sale. They \vere then defrauded 
on December 20, 1948, \Vhen they receiYed $33,333.33 for 
one-fourth and ~Ioreton received $~S7,500.00. 
Nothing happened thereafter to create the slightest 
suspicion on the part of the co-o,vners that their attorney 
lvforeton w.as deliberatel~T and intentionally defrauding 
them until October, 1951. They \\Tere, as a n1atter of la,v, 
therefore, not required to n1ake any inquiry of any kind 
before that tilne. 1\foreover, the law is that although 
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they may have begun an inquiry which they abandoned 
before the fraud was fully revealed, it in no w.ay affects 
their rights or precludes them from maintaining the 
action they would otherwise be entitled to maintain. 
(b) 
It is sometimes generally stated that the statute 
of limitations shall begin to run against a defrauded 
person from the time when he should have discovered 
the fraud. However, that rule is subject to an overwhelm-
ingly recognized exception in situations where confiden-
tial relationship exists (as it did in this case) between 
the parties. The rule where confidential relationship 
exists is that nothing short of actual discovery of the 
full details of the fraud will set the statute in motion. 
Some pertinent authorities announcing both the gen-
eral rule and the law applicable to the case at bar are .as 
follow (emphasis supplied throughout) : 
Briece v. Bosso, 158 S.W. 2d 463, 467 (Mo. 1942, St. 
Louis Court of Appeals): 
"There must be reasonable diligence and the 
means of knowledge are the same thing in effect 
as knowledge itself. This rule, however, is subject 
to qualification where a relation of trust and con-
fidence exists between the parties. When a plain-
tiff is lulled into a sen8e of security by reason 
of such relationship, rendering it the duty of the 
defendant to disclose the truth, he is under no 
duty to make inquiry and the statute does not 
begin to run until actual discovery of the fraud." 
Rutherford v. Rideout Bank, 11 Cal. 2d 479, 80 P. 
2d 978, 981-983: 
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"* * * It is, however, the contention of the 
appellant that the fraud was open and patent, 
that since the slightest inquiry would have dis-clos~d the truth, nothing but the plaintiff's in-
excusable negligence kept her so long in ignorance 
of the fact that she had not received a fair price 
for her property, .and finally, the additional fact, 
which came to light in September, 1927, was not 
one of the facts constituting the fraud but merely 
Taylor's motive for con1mitting it. 
* * * 
"* * * The finding of a confidential relation-
ship is amply sustained by the evidence (Bank of 
America v. Sanchez, 3 Cal. App. 2d 238, 38 P. 2d 
787, and, in view of its existence, Mrs. Ruther-
ford cannot be charged with lack of diligence in 
making independent investigation either at the 
time or afterward. Barron Estate Co. v. Woodruff 
Co., 163 Cal. 561, 575-577, 126 P. 351, -±2 L.R.A., 
N.S., 125; Marston v. Simpson, 54 Cal. 189, 190." 
Spencer v. Nelson, (Cal. App.) 238 P. 2d 169, 179: 
"In Rutherford v. Rideout Bank, 11 Cal. 2d 
479, 80 P. 2d 978, 117 A.L.R. 383, in order to gain 
an advantage for a friend, the 1nanager of the 
hank in which plaintiff \Yas a depositor and \Yho111 
she constantly consulted on business affairs, 1nade 
misrepresentations \Yhich caused her to sell her 
ranch to the banker's friend for less than its true 
value. It \vas not until approxin1ately seven years 
later than plaintiff discovered the fr.aud. In the 
meantilne plaintiff had n1ade no effort to ascer-
tain the truth of the representations. In holding 
that this fact did not bar her action for da1nages 
the court said that in vie\Y of the confidential re-
lationship bet\veen plaintiff and the bank n1anager 
she could not be eharged "~ith lack of diligence 
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the time or afterward." 
Butcher v. Newberger, 318 P.a. 547, 179 Atl. 240, 
241-2: 
"In 26 Corpus Juris, page 1137, it is said that 
if fiduciary 'relation is obtained, nothing short 
of actual knowledge will prevent recovery for 
misrepresentations.' The jury has decided they 
would obtain here and that plaintiff did not have 
such actual knowledge. Indeed, they could not well 
have concluded otherwise. In the instant case 
plaintiff testified and no one contradicted him, 
that he did not know anything about the stock, 
would not have known the difference between 
Class A and Common Stock if he had read the 
certificate, and because of his 'implicit reliance 
on Mr. Morles,' defendant's manager, he took the 
certificate which the latter handed him. This the 
jury believed * * *. Under such circumstances 
plaintiff had the right to rely on the manager's 
statement without inspecting that which was de-
livered to him, and this would be so even if plain-
tiff by inspection would have known he was not 
getting what he had bought which was not the 
case here. 615 Flatbush Ave. Corp. v. Hatoff, 126 
Misc. 573, 214 N.Y.S. 138.'"' 
37 C.J.S., page 268, Fraud, Section 27 b: 
"If confidential relations obtained, nothing 
short of .actual knowledge will prevent recovery 
frorn misrepresentations." 
54 C.J.S., page 198, Section 194: 
"The failure of the defrauded person to use 
diligence in discovering the fraud may be excused 
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where their exists a relation of trust and confi-
dence between the parties." 
(c) 
Where confidential relationships are shown to exist, 
courts often reach the same result by in1posing an 
estoppel against the adviser to plead the statute of limi-
tation,s: 
Anderson v. Thacher, 76 Cal. App. 2d 50, 172 P. 
2d 533, 544-545 : 
"* * * Defendant Thacher cannot be heard to 
complain that plaintiff reposed too much confi-
dence in him. 'No rogue should enjoy his ill-gotten_ 
plunder for the simple reason that lz is 1i icti1n is 
by chance a fool.' Seeger v. Odell, supra, 18 C.al. 
2d at page 415, 115 P. 2d at page 981, 136 ~-\_.L.R. 
1291. The law does not applaud fraud and con-
demn the victim thereof for his credulit~~. *** 
"* * * The possible but antiquated autlzority 
that one m1tst assu1ne that e~·eryo1ze 1rith u·honl 
he has a business transaction is a rogue and acts 
accordingly 1cill not receire judicial approval. 
Courts rather \Yill hold that one ean act upon the 
presumption that there exists no intention to de-
fraud hin1. Tide,vater Southern R. Co. v. Harney, 
3~ Cal. App. 253, 260, lG~ P. 66-±. * * * \\T e there-
fore hold that the eYidence in this case is reason-
ably succeptible to the conclusion that there ex-
isted a continuing confidential and fiduciary re-
lationship betw'een plaintiff and defendant Thach-
er. The evidence satifies us as it did the trial 
court that the delay upon plaintiff's part about 
which appellant Thacher con1plains "~as induced 
by his O\\Tn representations to her, and bY reason 
thereof, even if rit be conceded that th~ statute 
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of limitations commenced to run as cont.ended for 
by hirn he is estopped from taking advantage of 
the statute. Calistoga National Bank v. Calistoga 
Vineyard Co., 7 C.al. App. 2d 65, 72, 46 P. 2d 
246." 
In McKee v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 550, 
206 P. 2d 715, 717, 718, 719, this Court, while finding 
that the plaintiff in that case failed to prove facts suffi-
cient to establish an estoppel, clearly announced its recog-
nition of the estoppel rule, which, as appears from its 
opinion in that c.ase, is plainly applicable to the case at 
bar: 
"Inasmuch as there is a period greater than 
three year.s between the date of the accident and 
the time plaintiff filed his application for compen-
sation, the decision of the Industrial Commission 
must be affirmed unless, .as plaintiff contends, 
the statute has either been waived or the Pipe 
Company is estopped from setting it up in bar of 
plaintiff'.s claim. In this regard, plaintiff does not 
claim he could not have discovered the true nature 
of his injury immediately after the accident. In 
fact, he must concede his own medical advisor 
could have discovered the truth at any time by 
taking X-ray pictures or by examining those taken 
by the Pipe Company's doctor. Plaintiff seeks to 
avoid his own failure to find out the real cause of 
his trouble by contending that the company doctor 
either mistakenly or intentionally informed him 
that there had been no injury to his back; that he 
had a right to rely and did, in fact, rely uzJon the 
company doctor's diagnosis of the condition of his 
back and in so dotng he has been mesled to his 
prejudice. 
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"It is well established that a statute of limita-
tions will not run in favor of one who fraudulently 
conceals another's right of action against hinL 
* * * 
"Under these circumstances, the narrow ques-
tion to be decided is whether the Pipe Company 
is estopped to set up the statute in bar assun~ing 
an error was made by its doctor. Inasmuch as 
the Industrial Commission held that Sec. 42-1-92, 
U.S.C. 1943 was a bar to plaintiff's right to com-
pensation, it nece_ssarily rejected plaintiff's theory 
of estoppel. * * * if we are to reverse its decision, 
we must be able to say that, as a matter of law, 
the facts establish that all ele1nents of estoppel 
are present. Before plaintiff can prevail upon a 
theory of estoppel, it is incumbent upon him to 
establish his reliance upon the con1pany doctor's 
statement which we shall assume 'vas erroneous. 
* * * 
"We think it is clear in this case that no 
fiduciary relationship existed between the Pipe 
Co1npany's doctor and the plaintiff inasn1uch as he 
did not report to the doctor for a diagnosis of his 
ailment or for n1edical assistance. * * * l-.-nder 
these circun1stances, "\Ye believe that the colllillis-
sion could re.asonably conclude that plaintiff had 
relied upon physicians of his O"\Yn choosing rather 
than upon the state1nent of the con1pany doctor. 
and therefore had failed to establish his plea of 
estoppel." 
(d) 
The rule requiring diligence on the part of a plain-
tiff in order to avoid the bar of the statute of lin1itation~ 
is not applicable to the case before this Court for another 
reason. That rule applies only "~here the n1eans of dis-
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covering the fraud are shown to have been available 
to the defrauded party. It is manifest on the record in 
the case at bar and conclusively established that neither 
Rex Holland nor John Holland nor the Administrator 
of John Holland ever had sufficient reason to suspect 
or the means to discover the fraud. 
lVIoreton, by his testin1ony, established that prior 
to at least October 8th no one knew what price Columbia 
"\vas to p.ay for the mining claims and it is also clear on 
the record that after October 8th the only two parties 
that did know what price Columbia was to pay were 
~1oreton and Columbia. 
No one aside from these two parties had facts in 
their possession to give to either Rex Holland or John 
Holland had either Rex or John Holland made any 
inquiry. The record further establishes that not only 
would inquiry of anyone else have been futile but that 
any inquiry directed to Columbia or to Moreton would 
have been equally futile. 
Rex Holland did write to Columbia in the person 
of its President, Dr. Mathesius, on September 14, 1948, 
hoping to be advised as to the true situation. Mathesius 
never .ans,vered Rex but he did take Rex's letter straight 
over to Moreton, who proceeded to mislead Columbia 
by reference to some of the cunningly drawn documents 
which he had previously fraudulently induced his clients 
to sign and by procuring the signature of his clients to 
three further completely misleading letters (Exhibits 
P-16, P-17 and P-19) which he prepared and so phrased 
as to make it appear to his clients that the price c·olumbia 
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was to p.ay had not yet been established even though 
l\foreton and Mathesius had known the price since at 
least October 8th. 
In a situation such as this, the courts have in un-
mistakable language announced that the wrongdoer shall 
not be permitted to keep the profits of his fraud by 
asserting th.at his victim should not have trusted him 
but should have questioned him sooner. The courts have 
made it clear that the statute 'vill not be set in motion 
where the only 1neans for discovering the fraud lay with 
the party perpetrating the fr.aud and. \\There any other 
means "\Vere shown to have been foreclosed. 
Adams v. Harrison, 3-:1 Cal. App. 2d 288, 93 P. 2d 
237, 243-244: 
"Moreover, it does not appear that means of 
knowledge were then open to the respondent or 
that any reasonable inquiry on his part ''""ould 
have developed the true facts "ith respect to the 
real fraud, vvhich is here in issue. It appears that 
after he had reoeired au inti;nation of this fraudJ 
in 1936, the ~responden-t ·zreut to J·udson, franz 
whonz the land had been, purchased~. to Ju.dson 's 
attorney and to the real estate agent \Yho had 
represented Judson, all of zchonz refused to give 
hin1 any infornzation on that subject. It does not 
appear that an earlier inquiry \rould have been 
1nore .successful, and it is not to be anticipated 
that the appella1lf 1could hare been any nzor.e help-
ful had an inquiry been nz.ade of h·hn. 
Sl~JJIC .,,_ J.l!alouf, 95 ('1al App. ~d 8:2, :212 P.:2d 946, 
960-961: 
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"Defendants cannot prevail on the point of 
discovery unless the record shows, as a matter 
of law, that avenues of inquiry were open to Sime, 
which, if explored, would have resulted in dis-
covery of the fraud. In order that one who claims 
to have been defrauded be charged with construc-
tive kno\vledge of the facts constituting the fraud, 
it 1nust appear not only that he h.ad notice of 
facts sufficient to put a prudent person upon 
inquiry, but also that means for the discovery of 
the facts were available to him. Hobart v. Hobart 
Estate Co., supra, 26 Cal. 2d at page 435, 159 
P. 2d 958; West v. Gre.at Western Power Co., 
supra, 36 Cal. App. 2d 403, 407, 97 P. 2d 1014; 
Adams v. Harrison, 34 Cal. App. 2d 288, 299, 93 
P. 2d 237. It is argued by defendants that inquiry 
made of some of the defendants would have de-
veloped the facts constituting the conspiracy, and 
that if plaintiff had taken depositions in the action 
of sunday against E. R. & W. he would thus have 
uncovered the facts. A sufficient answer is that 
the trial court did not believe the means of dis-
covery were available to plaintiff in a practical 
sense. We have no hesitation in agreeing with this 
view. Plaintiff could not fairly have been charged 
with notice of facts which he could have [,earned 
only ottt of the mouths of the conspirators, tuho 
were successfully endeavoring to conceal them. 
Adams v. Harrison, supra, 34 Cal. App. 2d 288, 
299, 93 P. 2d 237; see also Kimball v. Pacific Gas 
& Elec. Co., 220 Cal. 203, 30 P. 2d 39; Kane v. 
Cook, 8 Cal. 449; Marshall v. Buchanan, 35 C.al. 
264, 95 Am. Dec. 95." 
Vanzandt v. Vanzandt, 86 So. 2d 466, 470-471 (Sup. 
Ct., Miss. 1956) : 
"It is argued by the appellants, however, that 
the appellees cannot invoke the foregoing statute 
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becau,se they fail to exercise re.asonable diligence 
to discover the fraud. This argument by appellant 
must likewise be held to be untenable * * * he 
has persisted in * * * (his misrepresentation) * * * 
throughout and even in the trial of this lawsuit, 
and it is manifest that no inquiry ntade of hirn 
would have disclosed any other information. fie 
occupied a position of trust and confidence with 
appellees which was calculated to cause them to 
rely upon his statement even if inquiry as to the 
true facts had been made. We think, therefore, 
that the Chancellor was amply w.arranted under 
the evidence in finding that there had been no 
lack of diligence on the part of the appellees." 
(e) 
It is, moreover, clear that the circumstances in this 
case surrounding the letter of September 14th, written 
by Rex to Dr. Mathesuis, \vere not, as a 1natter of la-\-r, 
sufficient to put him on .any inquiry in vie\v of the exist-
ence of the confidential relationship bet\Yeen him and the 
defendant Moreton. (That he did actually conunence an 
inquiry is, of course, no bar. See Hobart \. Hobart, 
supra). It n1ust be .re1nen1bered that Rex did not learn 
of any "facts" which caused hi1n to \Yrite that letter. 
The incident "\Yhich g.aYe rise to the letter "\Yas a casual 
conversation \vith a total stranger nan1ed Parley Can-
field who had nothing to do 'vith the transaction. Even 
Canfield did not give Rex any ~'facts~, as to the trans-
.action. He gave only son1e 1nisinforn1ation as to the 
amount of tonnage "Thich he (Canfield) believed to be 
in the M & H Clailns and as to the price "\Yhich he (Can-
field) believed to have been paid for son1e ore. 
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The law is clear that such a casual statement of 
opinion, belief and misinformation from .a stranger to 
the transaction is not the kind of "discovery'' which will 
set the statute of limitations in 1notion so as to protect 
an attorney willfully and intentionally defrauding his 
clients. 
54 C.J.S., 197, Limitations of Actions, Section 191: 
"* * * a mere suspicion of fraud is not suffi-
cient to constitute a discovery which will set the 
statute in motion." 
I-Iartford Empire Co. v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 47 F. 
Supp. 711, 716 (D.C. vV.D. Pa. 1942) : 
"The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in 
Emery v. Third National Bank of Pittsburgh, 308 
Pa. 504, on page 513, 162 A. 281, on page 284, 
where a charge of misrepresentation of the value 
of certain assets was made, s.aid: 'But a bare 
suspicion or an opportunity to learn the truth 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence does 
not constitute knowledge of fraud sufficient to 
prevent recovery.' This statement of the law was 
reaffirmed in a second hearing of this case at 
314 P.a. 544, 171 A. 881. We therefore conclude 
defendant is not barred from setting up the fraud 
alleged in the answer and counterclaim, either by 
the Pennsylvania statute of limitation or by 
laches." 
~~ttarkweather v. Benjamin, 32 Mich. 305, 306 (1875): 
"It is alleged as error .also that the court 
should not have ruled out the common rumor con-
cerning the size of the land. * * * 
"It would be absurd to allow street talk about 
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the size of a farm to rebut the conclusions of 
fraud arising out of positive untruths. It is cer-
tainly not presumable that others will know better 
than the parties interested; and even if such 
rumors have been multiplied and brought home 
to Benjamin, he would be justified in believing 
Starkweather's statements based on better kno\vl-
edge." 
Williarns v. Riddlesperger, 217 Ala. 62, 114 So. 796, 
798 (1927) : 
"There is no merit in defendant's contention 
that their rejoinder to plaintiff's replication to 
the plea of lin1itation w.as conclusively established 
by the evidence. The mere opinion of an attorney 
to whom plaintiff casually mentioned her first 
purchase of stock that it was worthless * * * a·id 
not amount to knowledge or notice of the falsity 
of the representations rnade to plaintiff by a.efend-
ants. Certainly they cannot with propriety contend 
that plaintiff was bound, as a rnatter of laze, to 
accept the attorneyl s ttl1tfavorable opinion, and to 
discredit the specific statements of fact made to 
her by these defendants \Yhonl she kne,, ... to be 
well inforn1ed and upon \Yhose business character 
and judgment she strongly relied.'" 
Haight v. Hoyt, 19 N.Y. 464, 6-±S: 
'''~ * * A party nzakhzg fraudulent represen-
tations upon the sale of property by hi.nz cannot 
defend hin1sel.f, as a nzatter of la1r. upon the 
grou.nd that a btJSfander stated the real facts. The 
purchaser Inay '-rely upon the staten1e~ts of the 
vendor; and \Yhether he does so relY and is there-
by induced to purchase is a questio~ for the jury. 
It does not appear that the plaintiffs had any 
other 1neans of ascertaining the truth than the 
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statements made by Hoyt and Delavan at the time 
of the purchase. They were not, therefore, guilty 
of any negligence in not ascertaining the facts." 
(f) 
It should not and is not the policy of the law to 
permit the confidential relationship of .attorney-client 
to be destroyed upon the statement of a mere bystander 
to a transaction between the attorney and his client. 
Yet that would be the effect of a decision that the un-
supported statements of Canfield (which within two 
·weeks Rex discovered were mistaken) were sufficient as 
.a matter of lavv to destroy the attorney-client relation-
ship between Rex and the defendant Moreton and to 
require Rex from that point on to question and investi-
gate everything that his attorney, Moreton, said and 
did. There '.vould be nothing left to the relationship 
of attorney-client if such a proposition were held to be 
the law and if a client were required at his peril to be 
on notice .as against his own lawyer every time he heard 
something from someone in the street. 
The courts have recognized the importance of up-
holding confidential relations and have refused to an-
nounce any rule which would permit them to be destroyed 
upon the statements of strangers or upon circun1stances 
giving rise to suspicion. 
Larson v. JJcMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170 P. 324, 325-
326: 
"This is an action for deceit. The principal 
question is whether the .action is barred by the 
statute of limitations. 
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'"Whatever their relations to others may have 
been, the principles in this unfortunate affair 
were not dealing at arm's length. They were con-
jugate; and their relations inter sese were as 
fiduciary as if the rnarriage had been a valid one. 
The trust of a wife is not to be swept away as a 
thistledown by a breath of suspicion. It is the 
policy of the law, for the good of society demands 
it, that trust and confidence between a husband 
and wife shall be sustained to the very limit." 
Sp~encer ~ Nelson, (Dist. Court of App. Cal. 1st 
Dist.) 238 P. 169, 178, 179: 
"The character of the hostility between the 
parties must be considered. * * * 'Differences 
might have existed without destroying confidence 
in each other's honesty and integrity.' Shiels Y. 
Nathan, 12 c·al. App. 618, 108 P. 3-±, 40. There 
husband and wife had had 'differences' and sep-
arated on the very date the contr.act "'\Yas entered 
into, relying upon the husband's representations. 
In Ran1os v. Pacheco, 64 Cal. App. 2d 304, 309, 148 
P. 2d 704, it "\Vas contended that by reason of 
respondent's fear of .appellant induced by hi8 
threats against her the confidential relationship 
ceased to exist. The court held that this did not 
destroy the confidential relationship. The ques-
tion of "'\vhether the situation should have put 
defendant on inquiry is one of fact for the trial 
court. We cannot say as a n1a tter of la"'\Y that dur-
ing this period anything occurred "'\Yhich should 
have Inade defendant suspicious that he had been 
overreached. A reasonable interpretation of the 
hostility is that it indicated at n1ost that plaintiff 
was standing strictly on his rights under the con-
tract but gave no indication to defendant that the 
contract itself "'\Yas not binding. £./or 'leas it such 
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that we can say as a matter of law that it over-
came the confidential relationship which in spite 
of it still existed between plaintiff and defendants 
and therefore put defendants on inquiry as to the 
validity of the contract." 
Hunt v. Smith, 24 S.E. 2d 164, 167 (Sup. Ct. S.C. 
1934) : 
"The question is: when did the appellant 
discover the facts constituting the fraud~ 
* * * 
"* * * the grantee's failure to reconvey the 
property within the time agreed, and his failure 
subsequently to carry out his successive promises 
to make the reconveyance, did not constitute notice 
to the appellant of the fraudulent scheme. * * * 
Although his non action and his broken promises 
should have giv,en rise to suspicion and would 
have warranted and indeed called for the insti-
tution of the action at a much earlier date, it 
would be putting a premium on dishonesty to hold 
in this case that because the appellant hung onto 
the hope (even a hope punctured by doubt and 
fear) that ultimately the grantee would carry out 
his assurances, she was under a l.egal obligation 
to determine that the grantee had undertaken to 
defraud her or her property." 
(g) 
In the case at bar it is crystal clear that as a matter 
of fact the confidential relationship between the parties 
was never destroyed until long after the transaction 
was consummated. Moreton knew after September 14th 
.and throughout the remainder of the transaction that 
the co-owners were continuing to rely on him as their 
attorney and he never told them to go to any other 
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attorney. The co-owners on their part never discharged 
1\{oreton after the conversation between Rex and Canfield 
or after the letter which Rex wrote to l\1:athesius on 
September 14th. r~othing is more conclusive of their 
implicit and continuing confidence in 1\l:oreton as their 
attorney than the fact that in 1949, .after this transaction 
was consummated, the Hollands employed Thioreton as 
the attorney for the Estate of John Holland. He him-
self accepted that employment and he continued in that 
capacity until he was discharged in 1953. 
The California case of Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 
26 Cal. 2d 412, 159 P. 2d 958, 972, 972-97 -±, involved both 
the existence of a confidential relationship and the issue 
of \vhat kind of discovery on the part of the victim of 
the fraud is .sufficient to set the statute of limitations 
in motion. In that case the plaintiff had actually partici-
pated in depositions which brought out son1e of the facts 
of the fr.aud of his fiduciary, an attorney named Greene. 
The depositions and the investigation in connection there-
with vvere apparently abandoned before Greene's fraud 
was fully uncovered. The date of the depositions \Yas 
such that if they con.stituted the type of discovery that 
would set the statute of linlitations in n1otion, then plain-
tiff's cause of action against his fiduciary "~as barred. 
Because the California Supren1e Court in that case 
explored so1ne of the problen1s inYolYed here so com-
pletely, we quote at length fron1 its opinion in w~hich it 
held that the plaintiff's cau.se of action \Yas not barred, 
notwithstanding that an investig.ation \Yhich, if pursued, 
would have led to a full discovery of the fraud "~as begun 
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and then abandoned, and that this was so because of 
the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the 
parties. 
flobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 159 P. 
2d 958, 971, 972-97 4: 
"* * * A defrauded person, how,ever is not 
barred from maintaining an action 1nerely because 
he comn~enced an investigation if it was incom-
plete or abandoned before discovery of the falsity, 
particularly if the defendant has a superior knowl-
edge of the facts, or if it is difficult for the p.lain-
tiff to ascertain all the facts or he is not competent 
to judge the facts without expert assistance. See, 
for example, Shearer v. c·ooper, 21 Cal. 
2d 695, 702, 704, 134 P. 2d 764; French v. Free-
man, 191 Cal. 579, 587, 588, 217 P. 515; Payne 
v. Clow, 114 Cal. App. 597, 600, 601, 300 P. 138; 
Wilson v. Municipal Bond Co., 7 Cal. 2d 144, 151, 
152, 59 P. 2d 97 4; 37 C.J.S., Fraud, Sections 37-
39, pp. 286-288. * * * Moreover, there was evidence 
that plaintiff did not make a complete investiga-
tion because of his reliance upon Greene's repre-
sentations. See Shearer v. Cooper, supra, 21 Cal. 
2d 695, 704, 134 P. 2d 764; Div,ani v. Donovan, 
214 Cal. 447, 453, 6 P. 2d 247. 
u Defendants contend that certain facts known 
to plaintiff should have aroused his suspicions 
and precluded his reliance upon the repres,enta-
tions assertedly made by Greene. It appears that 
the proponents in the will contest took the deposi-
tion of Howard G. Stevenson, secretary of the 
company, .and that Lachmond was present as at-
torney for plaintiff and inquired of Stevenson 
concerning the value of the company's assets and 
examined copies of the balance sheets of the com-
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pany for the years 1932, 1933, and 1934, which 
listed all the assets and liabilities of the company. 
Defendants .argue that having acquired this in-
formation through his attorney, plaintiff could 
not rely upon Greene's representations of value. 
* * * It is obvious that the balance sheets did 
not fairly represent the actual value of the cor-
porate assets and that plaintiff had been so in-
formed. It cannot therefore be said, as a matter 
of law, that plaintiff was prevented from acoept-
ing the representations of Greene as true because 
of the difference in the value of the stock as 
shown by the books and as represented by Greene. 
* * * 
"Defendants assert that in addition to these 
requirements plaintiff must show that he made a 
diligent inquiry to discover whether or not he had 
been defrauded, and they argue that plaintiff 
failed to prove that earlier inquiry would not have 
revealed the falsity of the alleged representations. 
It is not in .every case, however, that a person 
is barred after three years by fail'llre to ptttrsue 
an available means of discoveri1~g possible frau,d. 
* * * 
" * * * Accordingly, we must now determine 
whether plaintiff has brought himself ·w·ithin the 
exception to the statute of lin1itations. Plain tiff's 
evidence, if believed, di-sclosed certain factors that 
may have tended to discourag.e the 1naking of an 
exhaustive independent ·inrestigati.on, and ·zce can-
not hold, as a nzatter of laze, that any of the cir-
cuJnstances knou~ n to plai'ldiff shou1 a have p'llf a 
reasonably prudent 1nan. upon ·inquiry. * * * 
"A not her pertinent factot'" is that thet~e was a 
judiciary rtelatio·nship bet·zceen the parties at the 
tinte of the f1·andtt1ent represe1dati.ons. Although 
the general rules relating to pleading and proof 
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of f.acts excusing a late discovery of fraud remain 
applicable, it i.s recognized that in cases involving 
such a relationship facts which would ordinarily 
require investigation may not excite suspicion, 
.and that the same degree of diligence is not re-
quired. * * *'' 
* * * 
uDefendants argue that the fiduciary relation-
ship terminated when the sale was completed and 
that plaintiff was no longer entitled to the benefit 
of the rule. The relationship, nevertheless, did 
exist at the time of the asserted fraud, and plain-
tiff was under no duty to make a complete s,earch 
and reexamination of the entire transaction im-
mediately after it took place merely because the 
fiduciary relationship betw,een the parties was 
terminated thereby." 
(h) 
Another point to be noted In connection with the 
statute of limitations is that the defendant Moreton 
cannot urge that by recording the deeds he set the stat-
ute of limitations in motion. The rule is that where a 
confidential relation is shown to exist the recording of .a 
deed does not give constructive notice of the fraud. 
Seeger v. Odell, 18 Cal. 2d 409, 115 P. 2d 977, 980-
981: 
"*** it is well established that he is not held 
to constructive notice of a public record which 
would reveal the true facts. Rest. Torts, sec. 540 
(b) ; see cases cited in 12 Cal. J ur. 764, 759; 
Prosser, Torts, 750, 751. The purpose of the re-
cording acts is to .afford protection not to those 
who make fraudulent misrepresentations, but to 
bona fide purhasers for value." 
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J(auffman v. McLaughlin, 189 Okla. 194, 114 P. 2d 
929, 935: 
"It is contended by the Kauffn1ans that the 
cause of action was barred by the several provi-
sions of the statute of limitations. In Clover, 
Adm'x. v. Neely, 116 Okl. 155, 243 P. 758, we held: 
'When a relation of trust or confidence exists, 
making it the duty of defrauder in the trust eapa-
city to disclose the true state of fa~ts, the de-
frauded party is not charged with constructive 
di.scovery of the fraud on account of the facts 
being a matter of public record.'" 
Barder v. lllcClung, 93 Cal. App. 2d 92, 209 P. 2d 
808, 811: 
"Neither can it be said that plaintiff \vas 
bound by constructive notice of the zoning ordi-
nance, because as stated in Seeger v. Odell, 18 Cal. 
2d 409, 415, 115 P. 2d 977, 980, 136 A.L.R. 1291: 
'The purpose of the recording acts is to afford 
protection not to those ''Tho n1ake fraudulent mis-
representations, but to bona fide purchasers for 
value.' " 
Peterson v. Peterson, 105 lltah 133 (1943), 141 P. 2d 
882, 885: 
"Lastly, Charles urges that the Yarious claims 
set up by the plaintiffs are barred by the statute 
of limitations. '\V--ith this "Te are unable to agree. 
Plaintiffs testified that they first got notiee of 
this alleged fraud in 1941 "Then Charles for the 
first tin1e asserted that plaintiffs had no interest 
in an~- of the property. Charles contends that 
plaintiffs had notiee of the alleged fraud or breach 
of trust as early as 1935 \rhen he recorded their 
quit clain1 deed. But \Yhat "Tas there in the record-
ing of that deed \\Thich \\Tould giYe plaintiffs notice 
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that he had breached his trust~ Such recordation 
was entirely consistent with the intent of all con-
cerned for they intended to put title into Charles 
so that he could, according to their theory, take the 
necessary steps to save the land." 
See also 54 C.J.S. 194, Limitations of Actions, Sec-
tion 189(b); Heap v. Heap, 258 Mich. 250,242 N.W. 252; 
Fa~tnt v. Hosford, 119 Io"ra 97, 93 N.W. 58; Gerlach v. 
Sch~tltz, 72 Idaho 567, 244 P. 1095. 
(i) 
lT nder the facts and circumstances of this case .and 
under the decisional and statutory law of this state the 
suit commenced by Rex Holland in his individual capa-
city is clearly not barred by the four year statute of 
limitations applying to the breach of a fiduciary relation-
ship, 78-12-25, 2, Utah Code Annotated 1953. J(amas 
Securities Co. v. Taylor, 119 Utah 241, 226 P. 2d 111. 
In that case a corporation brought suit against the 
secretary of the corporation for a breach of his fiduciary 
duty, he having delivered to a debtor securities held on 
the obligation and at a time when the obligation had 
become barred by the statute of limitations. In consider-
ing this problem the court stated: 
"It is further contended that action against 
defendant is for fr.aud, and that the three year 
period of limitations provided by 104-2-24 ( 3) had 
run between the date of discovery by some of the 
directors in the summer of 1943 that defendant 
had surrendered the stock, and the date when suit 
was filed. It is true that the allegations of the 
amended complaint charge that defendant em-
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ployed deceit, but viewing the charge i~ its. en-
tirety it is clearly one of breach of a fiduciary 
duty which would mean that the four year statute 
of limitations would be applicable, 104-2-30. The 
contention that action was barred by limitations 
was therefore properly overruled." 
The defendant l\1oreton did not rely upon this sec-
tion of the statute and under Rule 9 (h) it was neces.sary, 
if he relied thereon, to specifically designate this section 
and sub-section. In any event, the action of Rex Holland, 
individually, was filed one day before the expiration of 
the statute. The complaint was filed December 19, 1952. 
As regards the cause of action of the Estate of John 
Holland: 
Moreton again did not rely upon this section of the 
statute. As indicated under Rule 9 (h) it was necessary 
if he relied thereon to specifically designate this section 
and sub-section. Having failed to do so, he cannot clai.In 
the benefit of it. 
(j) 
The administrator of the estate of J olm Holland first 
entered this action by the an1ended con1plaint which '\Yas 
filed November 7, 1953. The order authorizing the ap-
pearance of the said administrator '\Yas dated Deeeinber 
4, 1953. 
The record conclusively establishes that John Hol-
land and his estate did not discover the fraud until Octo-
ber of 1951 and there '\Yas no duty on his part to n1ake 
investigation and there '\Yere no facts "yhieh came to his 
attention '\vhich \Yould require hin1 to 1nake inquiry before 
that time. 
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That being so, the statute of limitations .as a matter 
of law did not start to run until Octobe-r, 1951, and the 
filing of the complaint was within the three year period 
from that time and hence the court was in error in direct-
ing a verdict in favor of the defendants. 
The trial court also mentioned a one year statute of 
limitations. The statute referred to was Section 78-12-37, 
which, in .so far as material here, provides: 
"If a person entitled to bring an action dies 
before the expiration of the time limited for the 
commencement thereof, and the cause of action 
survives, an action may be commenced by his 
representatives after the expiration of that time 
and within one year from his death." 
The purpose of this statute is not to limit the cause 
of action of the estate, but i.s rather to extend it. If the 
statute of limitations applicable to the particular action 
extends beyond the year, then this longer period is the 
one within which the administrator has to bring the 
action. 
In Gray Realty Co. v. Robinson, 111 Utah 521, 184 
P .2d 237, this Court held in an action against the estate 
that this section permits an action to be brought within 
one year from the death of the deceased, but if the ap-
plicable statute extends to a later date then the .applicable 
statute prevails. This is the general holding of the 
courts on statutes of this kind. 2 Bancroft's Probate 
Practice ( 2 Ed.), Sections 495 and 496. 
We submit that under the facts of this c.ase this 
statute is not applicable because the fraud statute in this 
case extends beyond the year from the death. 
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POINT VI. 
REX HOLLAND AS ADMINISTR.ATOR OF THE ESTATE 
OF JOHN HOLLAND HAD STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO 
BRING THIS ACTION AND DID NOT NEED SPECIFIC 
COURT AUTHORITY TO DO SO. 
One of the reasons given by the court for granting 
the motion of the defendants for a directed verdict 
against the estate of John Holland w.as that the admin-
istrator had not obtained authority of the court to bring 
the action and to enter into the contract on behalf of the 
estate (962). We assume this referred to the contract 
employing the attorneys. 
A moment's reflection convinces that this ground 
is absolutely without merit of any kind. Action is brought 
to o bt.ain assets of the estate and the person against 
vvhom the action is brought, although it is for the benefit 
of the estate, contends that the administrator should not 
.be permitted to do so. The only tin1e this matter may 
be properly presented is \Yhen the ad1ninistrator seeks 
court approval of the costs, expenses and attorney fees 
which vvere expended, or incurred, in 1naintaining the 
suit. 
But in any event, there is a statute in the State of 
Utah which gives the ad1ninistrator authority to bring 
suits of this kind. Section 75-11-5, [~tall Code .... -!nuotated .. 
1953, provides : 
''Actions for the recoYery of any property, 
real or personal, or for the possession thereof, 
or to quiet title thereto, or to deter1nine anY ad-
verse clain1 thereon, and all actions founded 'upon 
eontracts, 1nay be 1naintained by and against exe-
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cutors and administrators in all cases in which 
the same might have been maintained by or 
against their respective testators or intestates.'' 
There is abundant authority for the proposition that 
this statute me.ans what it says and permits the adminis-
trator to do just as the administrator did in this case. 
I-Iatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 218, 148 Pac. 433; In Re Burt's 
Estat~e, 58 Utah 353, 198 Pac. 1108, 2 Bancroft's Probate 
Practice ( 2 Ed.), 543, Sections 44 7, 448 : 
POINT VII. 
IN REINSTATING THE JUDGMENT THIS COURT 
SHOULD ORDER THAT INTEREST BE ADDED THEREON 
FROM THE 20TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1948, TO DATE OF 
FINAL ENTRY OF JUDGMENT. 
A judgment on the verdict was rendered July 10, 
1957, in the sum of $120,833 and the portion of the judg-
ment for interest w.as left blank ( 281). Of that amount, 
$25,000 was for punitive damages leaving general dam-
ages in the surn of $95,833. This latter figure constituted 
one-third of the $287,500 which Rex was entitled to as 
damages for a wilful breach of a confidential relationship. 
Under the evidence Rex was entitled to this money on 
December 20, 1948. Hence the judgment should ,award 
interest to Rex at the rate of 6% per annum since that 
date. This Court has held that in a case similar to this, 
interest should commence to run from the date the prop-
erty was acquired by fraud. Gillespie v. Blood, 81 Utah 
306, 17 p .2d 822. 
POINT VIII. 
JUDGMENT SHOULD BE ENTERED IN FAVOR OF 
THE ESTATE IN THE SUM OF $120,833.00. 
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Individual defendants moved for a directed verdict 
against the administrator of the estate (237-242). As 
against the estate this motion was granted (960). As a 
necessary result, the case of the estate of John Holland 
was not submitted to the jury. However, the issues in 
the case were identical, involving as it did, the existence 
of a confidential relationship, whether or not there had 
been a complete disclosure by Moreton as well as a 
showing that the transaction was fair and equitable and 
that no adv.antage was taken of the Hollands. There 
was also the determination of whether or not the breach 
of the confidential relationship was wilful or deliberate. 
Also, there was the issue of the statute of limitations. 
While we have found no authority directly in point 
on this subject, we submit that the finding of the jury 
would necessarily have been the same against the defend-
ant on behalf of the e.state and that therefore judgn1ent 
should be entered for the estate in the same an1ount as it 
was entered for Rex Holland. 
In any event, 've sub1nit that the evidence establishes 
as a matter of law the cause of action of the estate as 
indicated in the foregoing argument and authorities and 
upon this ground also a judg1nent should be entered in 
favor of the administrator of the estate and against the 
defendants in the su1n of $120,833.00. 
CONCLUSION 
Everything necess.ary to establish plaintiffs' right 
to recover against l\[oreton and his fan1ily can be found 
in the docun1ents theinselYes that l\Ioreton hin1self drafted 
and his o'vn testilnony. Resort need not be had to any 
of plaintiffs' testin1ony. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
63 
A mere statement of the end result obtained by More-
ton for himself is more than enough to convince anyone 
of the fact that he, attorney Moreton, was unf.air, inequit-
able and overreaching in his dealings with the trusting 
co-owners and .systematically concealed the selling price 
from them. 
(1) Moreton had been an attorney, at the time of 
the trial of this case for over 40 years ( 583). He was 
experienced in mining law. He prepared almost every 
one of the legal documents mentioned in this law suit. 
( 2) The co-owners were aged, ailing, trusting, naive 
individuals. They had never before sold any mining 
property. 
(3) Moreton never denied Rex's testimony that he, 
:Jioreton, had stated at his very first meeting with the co-
owners that he would henceforth .act as their attorney in 
the patenting and sale of the property. 
( 4) The confidential relationship existed by reason 
of the facts that Moreton at all times obviously acted as 
attorney for the co-owners, as agent for the co-owners 
besides being a co-tenant of the co-owners. 
( 5) Moreton, in his own letters directed the co-
owners not to discuss the sale of the property with .any-
one else. 
(6) ~Ioreton must have known of the potential 
value of the property from the very beginning, otherwise 
he would not have sought the co-owners out and offered 
to take an option to buy the co-owners interest for $100,-
000.00. 
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(7) Moreton told the co-owners on several occasions 
that they could not expect to get more than 10c per ton 
because the ore in their property was covered by a very 
substantial overburden. Rex remembered these state-
ments .and that was one of the reasons why he concluded 
that Canfield's remarks about ore being offered at 25c 
a ton would not apply to the co-owners' property. 
( 8) Now here, (except in the original contract of 
sale drafted by Columbia, which Moreton rejected and 
de.stroyed and which the co-owners never saw) in any 
document Moreton or anyone else ever drafted does the 
total sale price appear. Moreton does not clain1 that the 
C0-40WneTs! \ever saw any document that disclosed the 
amount of money that he received from Columbia for his 
one-fourth interest. 
(9) The letters of October 16, 1948 and November 
20, 1948, that Moreton prepared and to \Yhich he secured 
the signatures of the co-o\vners, are concealing, mislead-
ing and deceiving, in that an1ongst other things, they ll11-
ply that Moreton has not yet n1ade a deal \Yith anyone 
for his interest in the property; and that he n1ight 1uake 
a deal vvith someone else other than Colmnbia on his 
interest in the property. They do not state the total 
sale price or the an1ount that ~foreton had already agreed 
to take. 
(10) The entire negotiations and the entire effort 
exerted h~T l\1oreton in the sale of the propert:~, according 
to Moreton hin1.self, consisted of a thirty -fiYe "Tord con-
versation \\rherein l\Iathesius stated that there ,Yere about 
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1,550,000 tons of ore in the property .and that he would 
pay for the property at the rate of twenty-five cents a 
ton, or a total sum of $387,500 for the entire property. 
Moreton replied that that was satisfactory to him. 
(11) Moreton cancelled the escrow that had been 
arranged for. An escrow would have revealed the total 
price being p.aid for the property. 
(12) Moreton rejected Mathesius' documents which 
recited the total purchase price and in.sisted upon Mathe-
sius submitting separate offers of sale and separate clos-
ing documents. 
(13) 11oreton himself, admits that he never told 
the co-o\vners what the total selling price was or what 
his family's share of the selling price was going to be. 
jioreton has admitted repeatedly that he never, at 
any time, ever exercised any of the options he allegedly 
or purportedly had obtained from the co-owners. 
(1-±) The property vvas not sold, leased or other-
wise disposed of on a tonnage basis. Therefore, Moreton 
was not entitled to receive all over $100,000. Even if the 
property had been disposed of on a tonnage basis the 
agreement of ownership being unfair and inequitable and 
having been secured as a result of lvforeton's fraudulent 
concealment, }loreton was not entitled to receive anything 
under it and should now return that which he has un-
lawfully received. 
( 15) The deal was closed in Moreton's office Dec. 
20, 1948. The co-owners had no lawyer other than More-
ton representing them. Columbia was represented by Mr. 
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Heald. According to both Rex and his mother, Mrs. Clara 
Holland, nothing whatsoever was said or done at that 
meeting which would give them notice that Columbia was 
paying $387,500.00 for the entire property. The co-owners 
assumed that Columbia was paying about $133,333 for 
the entire property. No revenue stamps were even visible 
during the meeting. 
(16) Canfield, a total stranger to Rex, told him that 
there were three and one-half million tons of ore in the 
property and ore was being offered for twenty-five cents 
per ton; Rex then wrote his letter of Sept. 14th to Mathe-
sius. Shortly thereafter it developed that Canfield had 
been completely mistaken about the size of the ore body 
in the M&H Claims. 
(17) Therefore, Rex concluded that since Canfield 
w.as obviously mistaken about the a1n01tnt of ore in their 
property, he was also probably mistaken about its price. 
(18) There was no reason for Rex, or anyone else 
for that matter, to believe that on September 14, 19±8, 
Canfield knew or had any Yray of finding out "\Yhether 
l\ioreton and Mathesius had agreed upon .a price or "-hat 
that price was. 
(19) Moreton ad1nitted, first "-hen his deposition 
was taken in 1953 and later at the trial, price "\vas not 
agreed upon or even discussed until about October 15, 
1948, or one month after Rex had spoken to Canfield. 
(20) The conversation that caused Rex to \Vrite the 
letter of Septernber 1-!, 1948, to l\iathesius took place 
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about a month before Mathesius and Moreton had agreed 
upon or even discussed the price. 
(21) There were actually only two people who 
would know what the price was when it was agreed upon, 
~1oreton and l\1athesius. Rex wrote to M.athesius who 
took the letter to Moreton. Neither Moreton nor Mathe-
sius answered or ever referred to the letter. 
( 22) The letter of September 14, 1948, from Rex to 
}fathesius, was written three months before the transac-
tion was closed. It, of course, has absolutely nothing 
whatever to do with the running of the statute of limit-
ations. The effect of this letter had dissipated itself and 
the confidence of the co-owners in Moreton was restored. 
The co-owners continued to follow Moreton's advice .and 
accept his statements and sign whatever he presented 
to them. The confidence of the co-owners was continu-
ing. They proceeded with the sale. They were then de-
frauded on December 20, 1948, when they received $33,-
333.33 for one-fourth and Moreton received $287,500.00. 
Nothing occurred after that date which should have 
caused them to make further inquiry, or give them notice 
of any concealment, misrepresentation or overreaching 
until October, 1951. Therefore, the statute of limitation 
did not begin to run until the discovery of the fraud, to-
wit: until October 1951. 
(23) The Holland family employed Moreton to act 
as attorney for the John Holland Estate again in 1949 
and Moreton was attorney of record for John llolland's 
Estate up until the summer of 1953. 
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(24) The co-owners did not discover the fraud that 
Moreton had perpetrated upon them for the following 
reasons : (a) they obviously had tremendous confidence 
in Moreton, witnesseth the fact that they apparently went 
along with everything that 1Ioreton asked for, including 
the fact that they signed everything that he asked them to 
sign; (b) the nature of the property v1as such that there 
was absolutely no way of determining \vhat its value \Ya~ 
let alone determining what price Columbia \vould pay for 
it because .apparently standing by itself it \Vas too small 
to have any value at all. In other words, it \vould not pay 
for anyone to install a facility to work a mine of that size; 
(c) actually, that mine \v.as valuable only to one person 
and that was Columbia. Had Columbia refused to buy 
the mine, it vvould have had no value \\~hatsoever; (d) it 
vvas a total stranger at the time, Canfield, who apparently 
stated to Rex that the property of the co-owners con-
tained three and one-half million tons of ore and ore \\~as 
being offered for 25 cents a ton; (e) actually, Holland 
was not required to act .at all upon the statement of a 
stranger in preference to the staten1ents pre\iously n1ade 
to him by his trusted adviser, ~Ioreton. 
( 25) :Th[oreton overreached the co-o\vners. He \vas 
unfair to then1. His agreen1ents \Yith then1 \vere inequit-
able. He never 1nade a full disclosure to then1 of e\ery-
thing he kne\v regarding the property. He led then1 to 
believe the property \\T.as bringing only $133,333.33 or n 
littl,e 1nore. He concealed the price that ("iolu1nbia had, on 
or about Oct. 10, 1948, agreed to pay for tht:• entire prop-
erty. 
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(26) However, the co-owners suffered no actual 
loss until the deal was closed on Dec. 20, 1948. That is 
the date upon which their c.ause of action accrued. Nothing 
at all happened thereafter until October 1951 that would 
tell them that the total sale price had been $387,500.00. 
In the meantime, Moreton was acting as attorney for the 
John Holland Estate and continued to act in such con-
fidential relationship, at least until the time this action 
was filed. 
(27) When Rex heard in October 1951 that Co-
lunlbia had paid .a total price of $387,500.00 he wrote to 
~1oreton asking for his proper share. Moreton answered 
(Ex. P -25, letter of Dec. 18, 1951). He refused to give the 
eo-owners the amount they had coming from him. 1fore-
ton even threatened to put Rex in jail if Rex pushed the 
inquiry any further (Ex. P -25). 
As quoted in Omega Investment Co. v. Woolley, 72 
Utah 474, 271 Pac. 797: 
"Such people should not find encouragement 
in the thought that, by keeping their machinations 
within the letter of the law, they n1ay find sanction 
for their practices and reap the reward of their 
craftiness. To the victim it is of little import 
whether his property is taken from him by a bold 
and forcible robbery or by an ingenious and un-
suspected deception. The injury to him is the 
same; and the evil effect of court decisions which 
permit the wrongdoer to enjoy the fruits of his 
chicanery is of no small import when viewed 'in 
the light of public policy.'" 
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should 
therefore: 
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1. Enter final judgment in favor of the plaintiff Rex 
Holland .and against Moreton and his family in the sum 
of $95,833.00, plus interest at 6% from December 20, 1948 
to the lOth day of July, 1957, plus interest on that entire 
amount at 8% per annum from July 10, 1957. 
2. Enter final judgment in favor of Rex Holland 
as Administrator of the Estate of John Holland, de-
ceased, again.st Moreton and his family in the identic.al 
amount, or, in the alternative, to order a new trial for 
Rex Holland as Administrator of the Estate of John 
Holland, deceased, based upon the trial court's erroneous 
direction of a verdict. 
Earnestly and sincerely urging all of the foregoing 
this brief is 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGs, WALLAcE, RoBERTs & BucK 
BRIGHAM E. RoBERTS 
NICK SPANOS 
WILLIAM JEROME PoLLAcK 
Counsel for Appellants 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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